I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decision in early 2014, Daimler AG v. Bauman, severely curtailed the reach of a particular type of judicial jurisdiction -that is, general jurisdiction -in the United States. 1 Holding that a corporation can only be * Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. My appreciation to the Filomen and Max E. Greenberg Fund for financial support for my research on this and other related projects on judicial jurisdiction. My thanks to my two research assistants, Kevin BENISH and Nathan YAFFE, who provided helpful research, editing, and proofreading assistance on this article, and to my colleague Aaron SIMOWITZ for his continuing conversations and his insights and suggestions. 1 Rev. 1121 Rev. , 1136 Rev. (1966 ("In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, Law, Volume 16 (2014 /2015 ) 218 sued at home -specifically at its place of incorporation or principal place of business -on claims unrelated to forum activity, Daimler put an end to nearly 70 years of jurisprudence permitting general jurisdiction over corporate defendants that carried on "continuous and systematic activities" in the forum state. 2 At the same time, the Supreme Court failed to provide significant guidance on the major issue raised in the Daimler case: whether and/or when a foreign (or out-of-state corporation) can be held subject to jurisdiction in a forum state on the basis of the activities of its subsidiaries. The Court's decision also created other potential issues, such as whether the heightened standard for general jurisdiction would apply to actions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards, as well as whether states can require corporations that are not subject to general jurisdiction to consent to jurisdiction as a prerequisite to doing business within their borders.
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II.
Background McIntyre was a specific jurisdiction case in which the United States Supreme Court ultimately held that an English manufacturer who engaged a U.S. distributor in Ohio to sell its products throughout the entire United States was not subject to jurisdiction in the State of New Jersey. The dispute was based on a product liability claim by a New Jersey plaintiff who was injured while using the English manufacturer's product in New Jersey. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. 
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A. United States Case-Law before Daimler
As reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 7 the constitutional underpinnings of judicial jurisdiction rested on territorial theories of power and consent. 8 Accordingly, the reach of a forum's adjudicatory authority extended only as far as its own borders, and applied to both individuals and corporations. For individual defendants, domicile or residence in the forum and service effected on the defendant while present within the forum state were the paradigm examples of general jurisdiction. Corporate analogues for domicile or "presence" created greater complexity. 9 The corporation's place of incorporation was considered its "domicile", and the corporation's presence could be established not only at its principal place of business but also where it could be said to have a certain level of systematic activity often based on physical offices and number of employees. 10 Rev. 569, 573 (1958) (noting that principles of due process "which were appropriate for the age of the «horse and buggy» or even for the age of the «iron horse» could not serve the era of the airplane, the radio, and the telephone"). 10 See P. KURLAND (note 9), at 582 et seq. (noting courts' willingness to find a corporation "present", even in the absence of "consent" if the nonresident corporation is conducting business "as to warrant the inference that it is present there"). 11 See P. KURLAND (note 9), at 578 et seq. Consent may be manifest in a variety of different ways. For example, a defendants is said to consent to jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing before the court, by contractually agreeing to suit in a particular forum (express consent), or by proceeding with litigation in a court and failing to object to jurisdiction (implied consent). Corporations have been viewed as consenting to jurisdiction if they Law, Volume 16 (2014 /2015 ) 220 that arose from the individual or corporation's activity -that is, specific jurisdiction -was permitted on a theory that the defendant had "impliedly consented" to jurisdiction over such claims through its conduct.
Yearbook of Private International
12
In 1945, in International Shoe v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court transformed the understanding of the constitutional authority for judicial jurisdiction in U.S. courts. In place of physical power, International Shoe and its progeny established the relationship between plaintiff, defendant, and the forum state as constitutionally critical in the exercise of both general and specific jurisdiction. Moving from a constitutional due process requirement of territorial presence to an inquiry of whether the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend «traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice»", 13 the Supreme Court reconceptualized the approach to both general and specific jurisdiction.
14 As to specific jurisdiction, the Court stated that the commission of single or occasional acts by a defendant out of which the particular claims arose, depending upon the nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, justified judicial jurisdiction by a state. 15 With respect to general jurisdiction, the Court noted "instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities".
16
Between International Shoe and Daimler, the Supreme Court heard only three cases testing the due process limits of general jurisdiction.
17 Each of the cases was relatively easy under the International Shoe standard. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 18 the Court upheld general jurisdiction as consistent with due process. In Perkins, the defendant Philippine corporation had been closed down during the World War II occupation of the Philippines. As a result, the operations of the company, which included an office, were conducted in Ohio. For all intents and purposes, Ohio was the company's de facto headquarters. In appoint a local agent for service of process. For further discussion of such consent after Daimler, see infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
12 Certain types of specific-act statutes were upheld on that theory. For example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court, resting on a theory of "implied consent" upheld as constitutional a Massachusetts statute that conferred jurisdiction over a non-resident who operated a motor vehicle in the state for claims arising from accidents from such conduct. Similarly, jurisdiction over corporations for claims arising out of the corporation's activities in the forum state was justified on a theory of "implied consent". 21 North Carolina plaintiffs -the estates of two minors who were killed in a bus accident in France caused by allegedly defective tires -brought suit in North Carolina against the foreign manufacturers of the tires, basing jurisdiction on the defendants' sales of similar tires in the United States, including in North Carolina. The Supreme Court's unanimous decision, holding that an assertion of general jurisdiction on these facts was unconstitutional, was unsurprising. Prior to Goodyear, most state and federal courts had held that a defendant's mere sales of products into a state was constitutionally insufficient as a basis for jurisdiction for claims that did not arise out of those sales (i.e., as a basis for general jurisdiction).
22
But since the North Carolina intermediate state court upheld jurisdiction in Goodyear, the Supreme Court had good reason to take the case in order to ensure that these well-accepted constitutional limitations on general jurisdiction were not ignored. 23 However, the Supreme Court went much further. Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court stated that general or "all-purpose" jurisdiction requires that a corporation's affiliations with a forum be "so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum state". 24 More specifically, the Court identified the paradigm situations of "at home" as the place of incorporation and principal place of business of the corporation, 25 leaving open the question whether other indications of substantial corporate activity in a state might also establish general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 28 Mercedes USA is Daimler's exclusive importer and distributes cars to independent dealerships throughout the U.S. Indeed, Mercedes' California sales accounted for 2.4% of Daimler's worldwide sales. 29 However, there were no allegations that Mercedes USA had any connection to the events in Argentina that gave rise to the claims.
30
The district court granted Daimler's motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding (1) that Daimler's own activities in California were insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction; and (2) that the California activities of Mercedes USA were not attributable to Daimler on an agency theory.
31
The main issue on appeal in the Ninth Circuit was whether the activities of Mercedes USA, which both parties had agreed was subject to general jurisdiction in California, could be imputed to Daimler. The concession by Daimler that Mercedes USA was subject to general jurisdiction was made prior to Goodyear, (2011) (arguing Goodyear's "at home" language is merely superfluous and did not alter current doctrine). 27 The Court referred to such cases as "decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer's territorial thinking" and stated that they "should not attract heavy reliance today". 33 Mercedes was said to be Daimler's agent for two reasons: First, Mercedes was performing services that were sufficiently important to Daimler that they would be performed by other means if Mercedes did not exist. 34 Second, because Daimler exercised some degree of control over Mercedes, it could be held subject to personal jurisdiction based on the contacts of its subsidiary.
35
It was on the "agency issue" that the Supreme Court granted Daimler's certiorari petition, presenting the question of "[w]hether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum state". 36 Although the case might have ultimately 32 In the Ninth Circuit, Daimler argued that because the concession was made prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Goodyear, Daimler should be permitted to contest general jurisdiction over Mercedes in California at the appellate level, given the new standard suggested by Goodyear. 33 The Ninth Circuit decision was itself a bit unusual. In a 2-1 ruling, the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over In Kiobel, the claims against Royal Dutch Shell (a Netherlands corporation) and Shell Transport (an English corporation) were based on allegations that the Royal Dutch/Shell Transport group itself had orchestrated and directed been dismissed on other grounds, 37 the broad interpretation of agency was the basis of the Ninth Circuit's holding, and the grant of certiorari reflected the Court's concern about that issue.
1.
General, All-Purpose Jurisdiction Is Extremely Narrowed
As noted earlier, in Daimler the Supreme Court reinforced what it said in Goodyear: general jurisdiction requires a corporation's affiliations with a forum be "so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home". 38 In the "at home" context, the Court pointed directly to the paradigm situations of place of incorporation and principal place of business. 39 In a footnote, the Court did observe that in an "exceptional case", a corporation's operations in a state other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render it essentially "at home" in that state.
40 But Daimler's activities in California did not approach that level. 41 abuses that were carried out by their Nigerian subsidiaries in Nigeria against the Ogoni people. The lower courts based jurisdiction over the Shell companies on the New York activity of the Nigerian subsidiaries. In the related companion case against the same defendants, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction on the presence of U.S. direct and indirect subsidiaries that did business in New York and in particular, on an indirect subsidiary's maintenance of an Investor Relations Office in New York that conducted work for Royal Dutch and Shell Transport in New York. Although the Wiwa case eventually settled, the same jurisdictional issue was present in Kiobel. However, there was some question as to whether the jurisdictional issue was properly raised in the district court in Kiobel, and it was not before the Supreme Court on the grant of certiorari. At the oral argument in Kiobel, Justice Ginsburg raised the question of whether the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. Plaintiffs' counsel asserted that the point was waived by defendants' failure to raise the issue properly in the district court, and defendants' counsel countered that jurisdiction had not been waived. In any event, no further attention was given to the issue of personal jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in Kiobel.
37 Plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Statute were subject to dismissal as impermissibly extraterritorial pursuant to Kiobel. Although the claims asserted under Argentine and California law were theoretically still viable, the court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. See As the author of the Daimler decision and the legal comparativist on the Court, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the approach taken to general jurisdiction in other countries, particularly noting that the European Union permits a defendant to be sued on any claim in the member state in which it is domiciled. 42 Citing to European Regulation 1215/2012 (the Brussels Recast), 43 she emphasized that the E.U Regulation defines "domicile" of a corporation as its "statutory seat", "central administration", or "principal place of business".
Although Justice Ginsburg purports to bring U.S. general jurisdiction into conformity with much of the rest of the world, she fails to point out how the interaction of the Daimler ruling and the Supreme Court's recent decisions on specific jurisdiction create a much more restrictive approach to jurisdiction in transnational cases for the United States. In the European Union and elsewhere, the constrained view of general jurisdiction coexists with broader permissible assertions of specific jurisdiction. For example, under the present European Regulation (the Recast), and the national jurisdiction regimes in many other countries, suit can be brought against non-resident defendants for claims arising out of an injury caused by the defendant in that forum state. 44 In the U.S., however, the Due Process Clause requires purposeful availment by the defendant, and has narrowed forum options for plaintiffs in these cases as well. 
Comity as a Factor in the Exercise of General Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court majority opinion in Daimler also called attention to the transnational context of the case, suggesting that international comity and the avoidance of international friction is a necessary element of the due process analysis. 46 To that end, Justice Ginsburg noted that the expansive view of general jurisdiction in the United States impeded a potential judgment recognition convention, 47 and could discourage foreign investment. 48 Because the Court's ruling
California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other State in which MBUSA's sales are sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 47 Id. at 763 (citing to the Brief of the United States). For a more comprehensive overview of those negotiations and the effect of the U.S. approach to general jurisdiction, limits the potential number of fora for general jurisdiction, the majority rejected the overlay of "reasonableness" that courts employ as part of the due process analysis in specific jurisdiction cases. 49 Justice Ginsburg explained that when a defendant corporation is "genuinely at home", a reasonableness inquiry is "superfluous" and only compounds the jurisdictional inquiry.
50
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the action should be dismissed.
51 But she criticized the majority for formulating a new rule and altering the "continuous and systematic" contacts inquiry that has been taught to generations of first-year law students, 52 particularly focusing her criticism on the majority's newly added requirement that those contacts are to now be viewed in the context of a defendant's nationwide and worldwide operations. 53 However, even taking the concession that Mercedes was "at home" in California and the majority's assumption that those contacts are attributable to Daimler, Justice Sotomayor found the exercise of jurisdiction to be unconstitutional as unreasonable, given that the case involved foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct. . 48 Id. 49 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n. 20. 50 Id. Still, Justice Ginsburg's explicit rejection of "reasonableness" is odd, given that the formal two-step "contacts" and "reasonableness" analysis was developed in a transnational case where the Court stated that one of the important factors to be assessed in the international context was the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction. Those concerns are precisely the ones Justice Ginsburg points to in her reference to international comity. 51 Id. Law, Volume 16 (2014 -2015 227
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III. General Jurisdiction after Daimler: Implications and Future Issues
A.
An Assessment of the U.S. Jurisdictional Developments and the Relationship between General and Specific Jurisdiction
Criticism of the "doing business" form of general jurisdiction in the United States prior to Goodyear and Daimler was substantial. 55 One difficulty was the indeterminacy of the concept, both as defined by state or federal law and as a function of constitutional due process.
56
Another concern was the broad opportunity for forum shopping that general "doing business" jurisdiction presented, particularly in transnational cases. 57 Multinational defendants with offices or extensive activities could be sued in the United States on claims that had no relationship to the activities in the United States, and in some circumstances the activities of subsidiaries operating in the United States made the subsidiary the agent for the parent for jurisdictional purposes. 58 To some extent, the most egregious excesses of general jurisdiction in the United States -where both parties are foreign and the dispute is centered abroad -are mitigated by the application of forum non conveniens. 59 However, when the defendant was foreign and the claim arose outside the United States but the plaintiff was a U.S. resident, dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds was more problematic.
With Goodyear and now Daimler, U.S.-style "doing business" general jurisdiction is basically at an end. Indeed, to the extent this particular issue stymied the attempt at the Hague Conference on Private International Law to negotiate a worldwide jurisdiction and judgments convention, that particular problem is now eliminated. 60 However, other aspects of the United States jurisdictional regime continue to present difficulties for a worldwide convention. One remaining 55 See, e.g. 57 In addition to offering U.S. procedural advantages such as juries, discovery, class actions, and contingency fees, courts in the U.S. often provided advantages for plaintiffs with respect to applicable law given the approach to choice of law in particular states. 58 See L. SILBERMAN (note 55), The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules, at 336 n. 25. 59 The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to decline the exercise of judicial jurisdiction if the court finds that an alternative forum is substantially more appropriate. For the effect of forum non conveniens as a mitigating factor, see L. SILBERMAN (note 47), Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context, at 344. 60 For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see L. SILBERMAN (note 55), The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules, at 337 et seq.
problem relates to the constitutional limits for asserting specific jurisdiction in the United States. To the extent that injury in a forum state -generally accepted as a basis for jurisdiction in most countries -does not suffice to establish direct (or even indirect) jurisdiction in many cases, obstacles to agreement remain. 61 Interestingly, another attempt -this time for a single (rather than a double or mixed) judgments convention -is proceeding at The Hague.
62
The Supreme Court's narrowing of general jurisdiction is further complicated by the restrictive approach the Court has adopted in cases of specific jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg, in responding on behalf of the Daimler majority to Justice Sotomayor's concerns that the narrowing of general jurisdiction would result in injustices, wrote: "Remarkably, Justice Sotomayor treats specific jurisdiction as though it were barely there". 63 In truth, however, Justice Ginsburg overlooks the Court's recent restrictions on specific jurisdiction in cases like J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 64 a case in which Justice Ginsburg herself was in dissent. 65 In McIntyre, the Supreme Court held that the English manufacturer of shearing presses who engaged a U.S. distributor in Ohio to market the presses throughout the United States was not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey on a product liability claim by a New Jersey plaintiff injured while using the press in New Jersey. 66 A majority of the Court concluded that because the manufacturer had not targeted the New Jersey market and only a limited number of machines "ended up" in New Jersey, the defendant did not meet the required "purposeful availment" of the New Jersey market to satisfy due process. During the oral argument in McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg asked the defendant's lawyer whether the plaintiff could sue the foreign manufacturer in Ohio, the state in which the independent distributor was located and the state to which the manufacturer sent its products. Justice Ginsburg never got a direct answer to that question, but the answer is critical in assessing whether and how specific jurisdiction can compensate for the restrictions on general jurisdiction.
Critical to the determination of specific jurisdiction is whether the particular claim can be said to "arise from or relate to" the acknowledged lesser contacts of the defendant with the forum. Thus, in McIntyre, jurisdiction over the English manufacturer in Ohio meets constitutional standards only if the claim for the injury in New Jersey can be said to "arise from or relate to" the manufacturer's sales to the Ohio distributor. The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet interpreted the "arising from/related to" requirement in the context of due process. 68 Lower courts that have considered the issue have applied different tests, and they have emphasized the need to preserve the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. 69 After Daimler, only a broad interpretation of "related contacts" in the (1989) . However, the Supreme Court declined to answer whether or not this assertion of "arising from" specific jurisdiction violated due process, and instead reversed the case based on a forum-selection clause that required the case be adjudicated in Florida. 69 For example, in O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit outlined three predominate approaches taken by state and federal courts: (1) The "proximate cause" test, which requires that the defendant's contacts be relevant to the merits of the plaintiffs; (2) A more relaxed "but for" test looking to a foreseeable connection with the forum activity and the ultimate claim; and (3) A "substantial connection" test that looks to see whether the connection makes it fair and reasonable to assert jurisdiction. In O'Connor, the court applied the "but for" test, and permitted the plaintiff, who had fallen at the Sandy Lane Hotel in Barbados, to sue the hotel in Pennsylvania on the basis that the plaintiff arranged the massage by telephone while in Pennsylvania after the hotel had mailed a brochure to his home in Pennsylvania. See also Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d (Tex. 2007) (evaluating these tests and applying a "substantial connection" test, but ultimately finding defendant's connections with Texas "are simply too attenuated to satisfy specific jurisdiction's due process concerns"). 
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context of specific jurisdiction will mitigate the consequences of Daimler's restrictions on general jurisdiction. 70 Otherwise, a foreign manufacturer who avails itself of the U.S. market and causes injury in the United States to a U.S. plaintiff will not be subject to suit anywhere in the United States. Even if such a foreign manufacturer had offices and extensive activities in a state in the United States, under Daimler it will still not be "at home", and thus not subject to general jurisdiction there. Perhaps the combination of Supreme Court decisions in McIntyre, Goodyear, and Daimler will be the impetus for the U.S. Congress to take legislative action to provide for jurisdiction in cases where a foreign manufacturer selling products in the U.S. market causes injury in the United States, but prior bills have languished in past sessions of Congress.
71
B. Jurisdiction over Foreign Parent Corporations Based on Subsidiary Contacts
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the agency question in Daimler but gave little guidance for future cases. The Court did reject the Ninth Circuit's view that Mercedes USA was Daimler's agent for general jurisdiction purposes because Mercedes' services were "important" to Daimler, and that if Mercedes were not 71 For example, a 1987 proposal would have authorized federal court jurisdiction over foreign defendants who injured United States claimants in the United States if the foreign defendants "knew or reasonably should have known that the product would be imported for sale or use in the United States". See S. 1996 100th Cong. (1987) . Rather than the adoption of a foreseeability test which might not satisfy the Court's present due process test, a more appropriate standard might look to whether the foreign defendant directed its sales to the United States as a whole and derived substantial revenue from the United States. A more recent proposal, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act, would have required a foreign manufacturer that desires to distribute certain products in the United States to establish a registered agent in the United States, specifically in a state with a substantial connection to the importation, distribution, or sale of the covered product. H.R. performing those services, Daimler would have had to undertake those activities itself. However, the Court said little more about when a subsidiary's activities can be attributed to a foreign parent corporation, particularly in the context of general jurisdiction. 72 Traditionally, two theories have accounted for the imputed jurisdiction over a parent on the basis of its subsidiary's activities: an alter ego theory and an agency theory. 73 Cases relying on the doctrinal niceties of either alter ego or agency theories for the assertion of general jurisdiction must first look to state law to do the following: (1) Assess whether the activities of the subsidiary satisfy the required standard of corporate presence or doing business usually defined by a certain level of systematic and continuous activities; and (2) Determine what is required to impute the behavior of the subsidiary to the parent.
When courts turn to the due process inquiry, the focus of the case law has been on the issue of whether the level of activity meets the constitutional due process standard for general jurisdiction, rather than on the role of due process with respect to the imputation question. But the latter inquiry is particularly important because any such imputation departs from the deeply ingrained "general principle of corporate law" that a parent corporation (so-called because of control through ownership of another corporation's stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. 74 The existing case law with respect to jurisdiction based on corporate affiliations is mostly muddled. On issues of jurisdiction (as well as for other issues), some courts in the United States have pierced the corporate veil to treat legally distinct entities as a single entity for jurisdictional purposes, attributing a subsidiary's contacts to its parent. 75 Such an alter ego theory is invoked when the parent has complete control over the subsidiary, or where there has been complete integration of the two entities. Other courts have used an agency theory to treat the acts of the subsidiary as those of the parent for particular purposes, including jurisdiction. However, as noted earlier, foreign parents rarely exert the kind of control over U.S. subsidiaries necessary to satisfy classic doctrines of agency. Indeed, the agency theories invoked by various courts in imputing jurisdiction to a parent on the basis of the subsidiary's activities differ remarkably. The result is that courts in certain states and circuits have presented global forum shopping Courts have not always distinguished between general and specific jurisdiction when attributing the acts of a subsidiary to the parent through an "agency theory". As I have written elsewhere, the attribution via an agency theory is most compelling when there is a connection between the dispute and the foreign defendant. 77 In such cases, the defendant's use of the subsidiary or affiliate has a direct connection with the claim being asserted. Consider, for example, an injury suffered by a U.S. plaintiff in a state in the United States by a defective product manufactured outside the United States by a foreign defendant. The product is distributed in the United States through the foreign defendant's U.S. subsidiary, and an injury results to a purchaser in the forum state due to an alleged defect in the distributed product. Jurisdiction over the manufacturer in the state where the injury occurred is justified for several reasons: the state has a strong regulatory interest in accidents that occur within its jurisdiction, litigation convenience is best served in an action at the place of injury, and a foreign defendant in these circumstances can expect to defend a suit in a forum where it has been in a chain of activity that causes an injury there.
78
In the absence of a formal subsidiary relationship, the plurality in the McIntyre case held that a defendant who uses an independent U.S. distributor to market throughout the country is not subject to suit on the basis of an injury in the forum state. 79 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent in McIntyre, the United States is an outlier in this regard; injury in the forum state caused by a foreign defendant (regardless of the existence of an agent) is a basis for jurisdiction in most other countries. 80 In McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg and the two other dissenters were prepared to find jurisdiction on the basis of the nationwide distribution activity of the foreign defendant's independent U.S. distributor who sold the machine to a party in the forum state. Indeed, Justice Breyer's concurrence suggests that he and Justice Alito might have been willing to accept this view if the factual circumstances of the case were different. Law, Volume 16 (2014 -2015 233
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Jurisdiction over a foreign parent on the basis of the marketing activity of its subsidiary in a specific jurisdiction tort case is even more compelling, and perhaps may be persuasive to other justices on the Court. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg makes this precise point when she writes for an almost-unanimous Court in Daimler: "A subsidiary […] for example, might be its parent's agent for claims arising in the place where the subsidiary operates, yet not its agent regarding claims arising elsewhere". 82 She elaborates further in a footnote, explaining "a corporation can purposefully avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or distributors to take action there".
83
A comparative perspective may be useful in this context. An interesting case from the European Court of Justice, Sar Schotte GmbH v. Parfusm Rothschild Sarl, 84 highlights the emphasis on the general/specific jurisdiction distinction. The case involved a contract dispute between a German corporate seller and a French buyer of various perfumery articles. Sar Schotte, a German company, initially sued Rothschild GmbH, the German parent of Parfum Rothschild Sarl (Sarl), and then realized that only the French subsidiary Sarl was liable for payment under the contract. The plaintiff then sued that French subsidiary.
The issue thus became whether the French company Sarl could be sued in Germany under the relevant European (Brussels) Regulation Article 5(5) (now Article 7(5) in the Recast), 85 which provides for jurisdiction regarding a dispute arising out of the operation of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated. The German court of first instance thought there was no jurisdiction in Germany, since Rothschild GmbH could hardly be regarded as an agency or establishment of Sarl in that Sarl was the subsidiary of Rothschild GmbH. The appeals court stayed proceedings to request a ruling from the European Court of Justice on the point.
The European Court ruled that even where a legal entity maintained no dependent branch, agency or other establishment, the pursuit of activities through an independent company with the same name and identical management and the use of such entity as an extension of itself would satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Article 5(5). The Court's analysis is instructive. It emphasized that when there is a close connection between the dispute and the court, and third parties are doing business with an establishment acting as an extension of another company, those parties must be able to rely on the appearance created.
One final comparative example is also instructive. Many countries have a jurisdictional rule, similar to Article 6(1) of the European Regulation (now Article 8(1) of the Recast), 86 which permits jurisdiction over all defendants when any one of them is domiciled in the forum state, if the claims are so closely connected that 82 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759. 83 Id. at 759 n. 13. 84 Case C-218/86 (1987), ECR 4905. 85 Brussels I Regulation (note 80), Art. 5(5); Recast Brussels I Regulation (note 43), Art. 7(5).
86 Brussels I Regulation (note 80), Art. 6(1); Recast Brussels I Regulation (note 43), Art. 8(1). they should be heard together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. The rule is not specific to parents and subsidiaries, although it might indeed cover such cases. However, even under that provision, there must be a good faith claim asserted against the anchor defendant in order to bring in the other defendants. Thus, in a case like Daimler, where no claim is asserted against the U.S. subsidiary nor could one in good faith be alleged, jurisdiction would fall short even under a provision like Art. 6(1).
87
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments after Daimler
In one potentially unforeseen consequence, the Daimler decision appears to have affected the jurisdictional requirements for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards, given the requirement in the United States that jurisdiction over the defendant is necessary in a recognition/enforcement proceeding. In a recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holdings A.S., 88 a Dutch corporation brought suit in federal court in New York to enforce an arbitral award rendered in Switzerland against a Turkish company, Çukurova. In a decision rendered prior to Daimler, the district court found that the award debtor had engaged in a continuous course of doing business in New York based on its own contacts with New York, as well as on the activities of its various agents, such that it was therefore subject to general jurisdiction. 89 The Second Circuit reversed on appeal.
90 Without deciding whether defendant had met New York's "doing business" test for corporate "presence", or New York's agency theory of jurisdiction, the court held "[w]hatever the purported scope of [New York law], Daimler confirmed that subjecting Çukurova to general jurisdiction in New York would be incompatible with due process". 91 The Second Circuit never considered that the plaintiff was seeking "confirmation" of a foreign award, which might alter the jurisdictional requirements. Certainly, the rationale of Shaffer v. Heitner, 92 which distinguished, for due process purposes, property as a basis of jurisdiction over a plenary claim from when it was used as a basis for enforcement of a judgment, provides justification for a different standard. Thus, whatever connection the Supreme Court has required for the assertion of general jurisdiction over a plenary claim, something less might suffice in the enforcement context. 93 A final conclusion will have to await further word from the Supreme Court.
D. Consent and General Jurisdiction
Heightened restrictions on general jurisdiction have created pressure to find other options for jurisdiction over corporate defendants, including statutes requiring foreign corporations to register to do business and thereby consent to jurisdiction. However, construing such statutes as consent to general jurisdiction raises a number of issues, including due process concerns. 94 It is true that consent has been a valid basis for jurisdiction since the years preceding Pennoyer v. Neff, and today every U.S. state has a statute requiring nonresident corporations conducting business within its borders to register with the state and appoint an agent for service of process. 95 However courts and commentators differ on whether such statutes result in consent to service only or to jurisdiction for some or all claims, 96 and due process concerns have become even more significant after Daimler. 99 The district court judge easily found that the defendant, Mylan, was not "at home" in Delaware, 100 but then considered plaintiff's argument that the defendant had consented to general jurisdiction when it registered to do business in Delaware. 101 Characterizing the issue as one of "statutory consent", the judge held that "compliance [with Delaware's registration statute] does not amount to consent to jurisdiction" in the post-Daimler world. 102 The district judge concluded that a contrary decision would be "specifically at odds with Daimler", given the many states in which the defendant is registered to do business. 103 As a result, the court invoked International Shoe, holding that "[j]ust as minimum contacts must be present so as not to offend «traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice», the defendant's alleged «consent» to jurisdiction must do the same". 104 Less than two months later, in the same district court before a different judge, in a case involving the same defendant and the same claims, the opposite conclusion was reached on the consent issue. In Acorda Therapeutics v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals 105 the district judge acknowledged the AstraZeneca case and its "rejection of consent as a basis for general jurisdiction", 106 but nevertheless held "Daimler does not change the fact that [the defendant subsidiary] consented to this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction when it registered to do business and appointed an agent for service of process in the State of Delaware". 107 The impact of Daimler on registration statutes that purport to create consent-based general jurisdiction continues to generate conflict in the case law. 108 Until one of these cases make its way to the Supreme Court, 109 the unresolved issue creates an unpredictable environment on still another issue of judicial jurisdiction.
At least one state legislature has indicated its intent to reassert general jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on a consent theory. Viewing consent as an independent basis for general jurisdiction not constrained by Daimler, the New York State Legislature is considering a bill expressly stating that registration to do business is the equivalent of consent.
IV. Conclusion
Daimler brings U.S. courts more into line with a world-wide view of allpurpose/general jurisdiction and limits forum shopping for actions with only a tenuous connection to the United States. At the same time, the Supreme Court's earlier decisions on specific jurisdiction constrain assertions of that type of jurisdiction more so than the approach of most other countries. The end result is that courts in the United States have closed their doors to transnational litigation against foreign defendants that courts in the rest of the world would hear in comparable situations.
Although the outcome in Daimler is clearly correct, the same result could have been reached on numerous other grounds, without the broad attack on general jurisdiction.
111 Indeed, the focus on general jurisdiction will likely have further ramifications. For example, the future of "tag jurisdiction" may be in jeopardy. As one lower court case recently noted, "Burnham's foundation has been severely undermined", especially in cases where foreign individuals in the United States are subjected to suit based on tag jurisdiction. 112 Given the new era of jurisdiction for the United States, courts and legislatures may seek alternatives to replace or substitute for the substantial restrictions on general jurisdiction. State registration statutes may be accepted as providing "consent" as a basis for general jurisdiction, but such statutes will have to survive a likely due process challenge. 113 Courts may revisit and try to expand the "arising out of" prong of specific jurisdiction in order to compensate for limited general jurisdiction and for the high bar to establish "purposeful availment" in specific jurisdiction cases. 114 Efforts to pass federal legislation that would permit jurisdiction over foreign defendants with substantial contacts with the United States rather than with just a particular state are likely to be renewed.
